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Abstract
Immigrants in Rome or Paris are more visible to the public eye than the Italian or
French engineers in Silicon Valley, especially when it comes to the debate on the e⁄ects
of immigration on the employment and wages of natives in high-income countries. This
paper argues that such public fears, especially in European countries are misplaced;
instead, more concern should be directed towards emigration. Using a new dataset
on migration ￿ ows by education levels for the period 1990-2000, the results show the
following: First, immigration had zero to small positive long-run e⁄ect on the average
wages of natives, ranging from zero in Italy to +1.7% in Australia. Second, emigration
had a mild to signi￿cant negative long-run e⁄ect ranging from zero for the US to -0.8%
in the UK. Third, over the period 1990-2000, immigration generally improved the in-
come distribution of European countries while emigration worsened it by increasing the
wage gap between the high and low skilled natives. These patterns hold true using a
range of parameters for the simulations, accounting for the estimates of undocumented
immigrants, and correcting for the quality of schooling and/or labor-market downgrad-
ing of skills. All results go counter to the popular beliefs about migration, but they
are due to the higher skill intensity of both emigration and immigration relative to
non-migrants.
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11 Introduction
Fear of immigration is once again manifesting itself strongly in Europe and other developed
regions of the world.1 Spurred by the recent crisis and giving voice to a large portion of
the public, many politicians argue that immigration￿ s negative employment and wage e⁄ects
have become unbearable especially for the less skilled. Do the migration data and economic
analysis bear out this pessimistic scenario? Might the populist outcry be ignoring a more
important ￿ ow of migrants? Does emigration, especially of highly educated workers, a⁄ect
the wages and employment of non-migrants? The loss of high skilled workers deprives their
home countries of the scientists, entrepreneurs, educators and other professionals who drive
their economies to higher levels of e¢ ciency and productivity.2
Immigrants in Rome or Paris are more visible to the European public eye than the Italian
or French engineers in Silicon Valley, but are they more harmful to the Italian and French
labor markets? This asymmetric view leads to economic misconceptions of the economic
e⁄ects of migration. The goal of this paper is to assess the impact of recent global labor
movements on the wages of those who do not migrate. We focus on the major European
countries since they have experienced both emigration and immigration, especially when
compared to the United States, Canada and Australia whose experiences have been primarily
shaped by in￿ ows of migrants. In addition, for comparison, we include several non-OECD
countries (Argentina, South Africa and Singapore) with signi￿cant migration ￿ ows as well
as Eastern European (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary) and other developing countries
(Mexico, Turkey) that have established important migration corridors with developed OECD
countries. We use a newly available dataset to generate measures of migration ￿ ows by
education levels for all countries in our sample for the period 1990-2000. We analyze the
wage e⁄ects on the highly educated (college graduates) non-migrants and less educated (high
school graduates or less) non-migrants separately to be able to assess the distributional
impacts along with overall e⁄ects.
In order to calculate these e⁄ects at the national level, we adopt an aggregate production
model which has been used in the evaluation of the impact of immigration at the national
level (e.g. Borjas 2003, Manacorda et al., forthcoming) and in macroeconomic studies ana-
lyzing growth, productivity and skill premium in the US and other countries (e.g. Acemoglu
and Zilibotti 2001, Caselli and Coleman 2006, Card and Lemieux 2001, Goldin and Katz
2008). We use this model to simulate the wage e⁄ects of immigration and emigration, iso-
lating this phenomenon from all other changes that happened in the same period. This
simulation approach bypasses the issues of endogeneity and omitted variables encountered
in the regression estimates of the wage e⁄ects of immigration. The results, however, rely in
important ways on the assumptions and on the parameter choice, which are therefore dis-
cussed and documented in detail. The model we use has four important components (with
1See, for example, the following recent articles from the Economist magazine on immigration to Spain
("Bad new Days", February 24 2010), to Italy ("Southern Misery" January 14th 2010) and to Europe in
general ("No Boatloads but still troubles" August, 12th 2010).
2Even the academic literature has been mostly concerned with the impact of immigration on European
Countries. Vis-a-vis the occasional study on the size of the "Brain drain" from Europe (such as Saint-Paul,
2008) there are scores of studies of the labor market impact of immigrants in Europe (see for instance Longhi
et al 2005 for a summary).
2associated parameters) that a⁄ect the conclusions of our exercise. We start with a preferred
(usually average) set of parameter values and we present the results as the benchmark case.
Next, we consider for each parameter a range of values deemed reasonable by the literature
and we discuss how robust our results are to these variations.
The ￿rst component of our model assumes that aggregate labor is combined with physical
capital to produce output. While capital may take some time to adjust to changes in the
labor supply, we assume that it adjusts in the long run to maintain constant the capital-
output ratio (and hence its rate of return). Such property may be derived from a classic or
neoclassic growth model (such as Solow 1956, Ramsey 1928) in the case of a closed economy
or alternatively from the assumption of an open economy. Most of our simulated wage e⁄ects
should be understood as long-run e⁄ects3.
In the second building block of the model, we combine labor of highly educated and less
educated workers in a function with constant elasticity of substitution. This representation
is common in labor markets studies (such as Katz and Murphy, 1992, Card and Lemieux,
2001) and in cross-country analysis of relative productivity (Caselli and Coleman, 2006).
Following the literature, we choose college graduates as the highly educated portion of the
labor force and we pick a range between 1.3 and 2 for the elasticity of substitution which
spans most labor market studies including Angrist (1995), Borjas and Katz (2007) and Katz
and Murphy (1992).
The third ingredient of our model is that immigrants and natives within the same
skill/education category are allowed to be imperfect substitutes within a CES structure.
There is debate in the literature on the estimates of the elasticity of substitution between
natives and immigrants. Borjas et al (2008) put it essentially at in￿nity, Ottaviano and Peri
(forthcoming) and Card (2009) put it around 20 and Manacorda et al. (forthcoming) put
it around 6. We will analyze the wage impact of immigration and emigration on natives
using each one of these parameter values. We describe the sensitivity of simulated average
wages and the distributional e⁄ects for non-migrant natives with di⁄erent education levels
to di⁄erent assumptions about this elasticity.
Finally, the fourth ingredient of the model is to allow human capital (skill) intensity to
have a productivity externality as immigration and emigration alter the skill composition in
an economy (i.e. the ratio of highly educated to the less educated). There is some debate in
the literature on this issue as well. Moretti (2004a and 2004b), based on data from the US
cities, puts the elasticity of productivity to the share of college educated between 0.75 and
1. On the opposite end of the spectrum, Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) estimate essentially
no productivity e⁄ect of increased schooling in US states. Iranzo and Peri (2009) estimate
an externality around 0.44 using US state level data. Again, we analyze the impact of
immigration, emigration and net migration under each of these parameter values.
While the speci￿c quantitative details of the simulations vary with the choice of parame-
ter values, some general results emerge from this exercise. First, in general, over the period
1990-2000 immigration had zero to small positive long-run e⁄ect on the average wages of
non-migrant natives in the rich OECD countries (Western Europe plus the US, Canada,
3In section 5.5 by making assumptions on how the total migration ￿ ows are distributed over the years,
and on the short-run speed of adjustment of capital we can calculate the short-run average wage e⁄ects
accounting, that is, for the sluggish adjustment of capital.
3Australia). Using the estimates for the average values of the parameters, this positive ef-
fect ranges from zero in Italy to +1.7% in Australia. Second, over the period 1990-2000,
emigration had a mild to signi￿cant negative long-run e⁄ect on the wages of non-migrants.
Still focusing on rich OECD countries, the e⁄ects range from 0 for the US (due to the near
absence of emigration) to -0.8% in the UK and -0.7% in Portugal. Third, over the period
1990-2000, immigration generally improved the income distribution of European countries
while emigration worsened it by increasing the wage gap between the high and low skilled
natives.
All three results go counter to the popular beliefs about migration, but they are a re-
sult of the nature of migrant ￿ ows from 1990 to 2000. European countries (along with the
US, Canada, Australia) have experienced both immigration and emigration that were usu-
ally more skill intensive than (or as skill intensive as) their domestic labor forces. Under
these conditions, in the long run, immigration is associated with average wage gains and
emigration with average wage losses for non-migrant natives unless there is no externality of
human capital and migrants are perfectly substitutable with natives. In this latter case, both
immigration and emigration have no e⁄ect on the average wages of non-migrant natives.
The skill composition of migrants relative to non-migrants is crucial in determining our
average wage results. We attempt to correct the "e⁄ective" skills of migrants to account for
certain important phenomena which might not be fully re￿ ected in our aggregate statistics.
First, we use estimates of the extent of illegal immigration into the main Western European
countries to correct for the in￿ ows of migrants into Europe. Second, we account for the
potential lower quality of schooling for migrants who completed their education in their
home countries or for the "downgrading" of their skills in the host countries￿labor market.
Both corrections reduce the e⁄ective percentage of highly skilled immigrants. While the
corrections make some di⁄erence, the general picture described above remains unchanged.
We consider two other extensions. First, we introduce the possibility of crowding e⁄ects of
immigrants on productivity due to the presence of a ￿xed factor or the presence of a positive
density externality, such as in Ciccone and Hall (1996), on productivity. While their presence
either attenuates or increases slightly the e⁄ects but leaves the basic results unchanged.
Second, we account for the short-run impact of immigrants by including in the simulations
sluggish capital adjustment. We distribute net immigration into yearly ￿ ows of immigrants
and assume a speed of adjustment of capital that is consistent with estimates from the macro
literature. While such sluggish adjustment generates a small negative contribution to average
wages in the short run, the overall short-run e⁄ects of immigration are still positives in four
of the ten considered European countries. When negative, these short-run e⁄ects are very
small, with the largest negative impact achieved in Spain in the order of -0.35%. Emigration
turns out still to exert a negative wage e⁄ect on non-movers in the short run and usually
larger, in absolute value, than the e⁄ect of immigration.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the simple aggregate
production framework from which we derive wages as marginal productivity of di⁄erent types
of workers. Section 3 describes the data, their construction and their sources and shows some
simple summary statistics about the educational structure of labor force data and migrant
data. Section 4 presents the basic results of the simulated wage e⁄ects of immigrants using
our model and the range of parameters available from the literature. Section 5 considers the
wage e⁄ect when accounting for undocumented workers, for schooling quality di⁄erences,
4for downgrading of skills, for density e⁄ects and adjusting for employment rates and for the
short-run capital adjustment. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Model
We construct an aggregate model of the economy to examine the long-run wage e⁄ects using
data from 1990 and 2000 national censuses on migration and native non-migrant labor force
by education level. The analysis builds on two di⁄erent strands of the literature. The ￿rst
strand aims at identifying the impact of immigration on national labor markets while the
second analyzes the external e⁄ects of individual schooling on overall productivity. In this
context, international migrations have two essential long-run e⁄ects. The ￿rst is to change
the schooling composition of the sending and receiving economy. The second is to introduce
in the host countries workers with a di⁄erent skill sets from natives and, hence, even for given
education, not perfect substitutes with them. These two aspects imply that the size and the
educational composition of immigrants and emigrants relative to the non-migrants are the
crucial factors in determining the long-run domestic wage e⁄ects of international migration
patterns.
2.1 Aggregate production function
The prevalent model adopted in this literature is based on a production function where the
labor aggregate is represented as a nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function
of di⁄erent types of workers. In the production function (we omit country subscripts for
simplicity), we assume that at time t output (Yt) is produced in a country according to
a constant-returns-to-scale Cobb-Douglas production function with two factors, physical
capital (Kt), and labor in e¢ ciency units (Qt):





The term e At represents the total factor productivity (TFP), and ￿ is the income share of
labor.
Assuming that physical capital is internationally mobile and that each single country is
too small to a⁄ect the global capital markets, the returns to physical capital are equalized
across countries. If R￿ denotes the international net rate of return to capital, the following
arbitrage condition implicitly de￿nes the equilibrium capital-to-labor ratio in the economy:
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The above condition holds in the short and in the long run in a small open economy.
However, even in a closed economy as in Ramsey (1926) (or Solow 1951) condition (2) holds in
the long-run balanced growth path, with R￿ being a function of the inter-temporal discount
rate of individuals (or of the savings rate)4. Hence in the long-run we can substitute this
4As long as immigration does not change the saving rate of an economy the pre- and post- migration R￿
are identical.
5arbitrage condition into (1) to obtain an expression of aggregate output as linear function of
the aggregate labor Qt:
Yt = AtQt (3)
where At ￿ e A
1=￿
t [(1 ￿ ￿)=R￿]
(1￿￿)=￿ is an increasing function of TFP and is referred to as
modi￿ed TFP.
Following the labor (Katz and Murphy 1992, Card and Lemieux 2001) and growth (Caselli
and Coleman 2006) literature, we assume that labor in e¢ ciency unit (Qt) is a nested CES













where ￿q is the relative productivity level of highly educated workers (with tertiary education)
and is set to 0.6 for the rest of the paper. The second parameter, ￿q, is the elasticity of
substitution between the two groups of workers.
We distinguish between natives and immigrants within each labor aggregate Qh;t and
Ql;t. If native and immigrant workers of education level s were perfectly substitutable, the
aggregate Qs;twould simply be equal to the sum of natives￿and immigrants￿labor supplies.
However, there are various reasons to believe that native and immigrant workers may di⁄er
in several respects which are relevant to the labor market. First, immigrants have skills,
motivations and tastes that may set them apart from natives. Second, in manual and intel-
lectual work, they may have culture-speci￿c skills and limitations (e.g., limited knowledge of
the language or culture of the host country), which create comparative advantages in some
tasks and disadvantages in others. Third, even in the absence of comparative advantage, im-
migrants tend to concentrate in di⁄erent occupations than natives due to migration networks
or historical accidents. In particular, new immigrants tend to disproportionately cluster in
those sectors or occupations where previous migrant cohorts are already over-represented.
Finally several studies (such as Card 2009, Ottaviano and Peri, forthcoming, Manacorda
et al., forthcoming) ￿nd imperfect degrees of substitution between natives and immigrants.
Hence, we assume that the quantities of high-educated (Qh;t) and low-educated labor (Ql;t)
are both nested CES functions of native and immigrant labor stocks with he respective












where s = h;l (5)
where Ns;t is the number of type-s native workers and Is;t is the number of type-s immigrant
workers who are present in the country. ￿I is the elasticity of substitution between natives
and immigrants in group s. The parameter ￿s captures the relative productivity level of
natives and is set at 0.6 for the rest of the paper as it was the case with ￿q. This choice
provides reasonable skill premia and wage di⁄erentials between natives and immigrants. Our
results, however, are insensitive to the value of these parameters.
62.2 Wages
We consider each country as a single labor market since workers are free to move within it to
arbitrage away wage di⁄erences. Then we derive the wage rates for native workers of both
education levels (wh;t and wl;t) by substituting (4) and (5) into (3) and taking the derivative























These expressions allow us to evaluate the e⁄ects of immigration/emigration on non-
migrant natives. The change in the average wages of non-migrant natives due to 1990-2000
immigration ￿ ows of immigrants (de￿ned as new gross immigration minus return migration
of foreigners to their home countries) is de￿ned as
(￿w2000)











where wh;2000 and wl;2000 are the wages of more and less educated natives, respectively, as
de￿ned by (6) and (7) and calculated using aggregates Qt+1;Qh;t+1 and Ql;t+1 inclusive of
immigrants observed in 2000. Moreover, wIMMI
h;2000 and wIMMI
l;2000 are the wages calculated for
year 2000 keeping the stock of immigrants as observed in 1990 (i.e. excluding the 1990-2000
immigration ￿ ows).
The change in average wage of non-migrant natives due to 1990-2000 emigration ￿ ows
of natives (de￿ned as new gross emigration minus return migration of natives) is de￿ned as
the following
(￿w2000)













l;t+1 are the wages of highly and less educated natives calculated for 2000
using the stock of emigrants observed in 1990 (i.e. excluding 1990-2000 emigrant ￿ ows), but
keeping immigrants constant at their 2000 values. Note that to compute changes in natives￿
average wage, we keep Nh;t and Nl;t at their 2000 values. Indeed, the e⁄ects on average
wage of non-migrants are weighted at the observed composition of natives. This isolates
only the wage e⁄ects of emigration on non-migrants and not those e⁄ects due to changing
composition of the domestic labor force. Adding the two e⁄ects, we obtain the average wage
e⁄ect of net international migration.
72.3 Schooling externalities
We also consider the possibility of a positive externality from highly educated workers, in the
spirit of the recent literature (Acemoglu and Angrist 2000, Ciccone and Peri 2006, Moretti
2004a, 2004b and Iranzo and Peri 2009). There is a large body of growth literature (beginning
with Lucas 1988, and extending to Azariadis and Drazen 1990, Benhabib and Spiegel 2005,
Cohen and Soto 2007 and Vandennbussche et al 2009) that emphasizes the role of human
capital (schooling) on technological progress, innovation and growth of GDP per capita.
More recently, however, the empirical literature has pointed out that while it is sometimes
hard to ￿nd an e⁄ect of human capital on growth of income per capita (Benhabib and Spiegel
2005), there seems to be evidence that human capital contributes to the level of income per
person beyond its private returns. This implies that TFP is an increasing function of the
schooling intensity in the domestic labor force. Such formulation is particularly appropriate
to be included in our model and, based on the expressions used in Moretti (2004a, 2004b),









where A0 captures the part of TFP independent of the human capital externality, and ￿
is the semi-elasticity of the modi￿ed TFP to the share of highly skilled in the economy,
Qh;t
Qt
5. Acemoglu and Angrist (2000) and Iranzo and Peri (2009) use a similar formulation
to express schooling externalities and we use their estimates of the parameter ￿. Relying on
this structure and using migration data from national Censuses, we can simulate the e⁄ects
of immigration and emigration on wages of non-migrants in a range of countries for a range
of values obtained from the literature for the three key parameters ￿q; ￿I and ￿.
3 Data description
Assessing the national wage e⁄ects of immigration to and emigration from diverse set coun-
tries across the globe requires country-level international migration and labor force data by
skill level. The detailed description of the migration data is in the Data Appendix. Here we
describe brie￿ y the main sources and features of the migration and labor force data used.
3.1 International migration data
The relevant migration ￿ ows to be used in our exercise are immigration and emigration ￿ ows
(namely gross ￿ ows of immigrants and emigrants net of returnees and re-migrants). They
capture the change in actual supply of migrants in a country.
There are several sources for migration ￿ ows by receiving country (e.g. OECD Inter-
national Migration database, UN migration statistics) but those only include gross in￿ ow
of people in a country and they almost never correct for migrants who leave or go back to
their country of origin. Moreover they never record undocumented migrants and they often
5The externality is expressed in terms of the ratio between labor composite. Such a ratio, however, is
almost identical to the share of workers with high schooling in the labor force.
8record immigrants when they achieve their resident status rather than when they ￿rst enter
the country. Finally, de￿nition of migrants - by nationality or birth - vary across countries.
Most importantly for our purposes, those data are not available by education level. The
￿ ows of immigrants to a country can only be recovered by measuring the stock of foreign
born people in a destination country (from a certain origin country) at di⁄erent points in
time and then taking the di⁄erence. The other advantage of starting with data on stocks of
migrants is that they are usually from national censuses which tend to be more representative
and complete than other data sources. Plus censuses often account for (i) undocumented
immigrants at least in some countries like the US, (ii) they categorize immigrants by place
of birth, rather than nationality which can change over time and across countries due to
naturalization laws and (iii) report their education levels.
Our database is described in Docquier et al. (2010) who construct bilateral measures of
immigrant and emigrant stocks for 195 countries in 1990 and 2000. The starting point for the
new data is Docquier and Marfouk (2005) which collected the stock of foreign-born in OECD
destination countries in 1990 and 2000, by country of origin and level of schooling (primary,
secondary and tertiary). These data are supplemented with original data from the censuses
of a large number of non-OECD countries. Finally, for many destination countries with
no data on immigration, bilateral migrant stocks were predicted using a gravity framework
as described in greater detail in Docquier et al. (2010). Their own census data would
su¢ ce to measure immigration into OECD countries. However, evaluation of emigration
also requires data from all the possible destination countries, at least the most relevant ones.
In other words, emigrant stocks from a certain origin can only be measured by aggregating all
migrants recorded in the censuses of all destination countries. As some important destination
countries (such as Russia, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, and Singapore) are outside the
OECD, this new database ensures the coverage of essentially all emigrants from all countries
in our sample. Table A2 in the appendix show that the majority of emigrants from Western
Europe are in destination countries for which we have actual census data.6 For most OECD
countries, less than 10% of their emigrants are in countries with imputed (rather than actual)
migration data. The only European country relying on imputed data for a large fraction of
its emigrants is France at about 30%.
We distinguish two skill types s, denoted by s = h for college graduates (referred to
as highly educated) and s = l for individuals with secondary education completed and
less (referred to as less educated). The database covers the years 1990 and 2000 and the
di⁄erences in stocks by country of origin and destination provides the measures of the ￿ ows.
It focuses on individuals aged 25 and over as a proxy of the working-age labor force which
is one of the main di⁄erences with other migration databases (such as Ozden et al. 2010).
This choice maximizes comparability between data on migration and on labor force per
education attainment. Furthermore, it excludes a large number of students who emigrate
temporarily to complete their education or children who migrate with their families.7 The
data description and some summary statistics follow.
6This pattern is also con￿rmed in Ozden et.al. (2010) which presents global bilateral migration stocks
but does not disaggregate by education levels.
7The dataset contains 195 source countries: 190 UN member states (after excluding North Korea), the
Holy See, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Macao, and the Palestinian Territories. We consider the same set of countries
in 1990 and 2000, although some of them had no legal existence in 1990.
93.2 Labor force data per education level
It is relatively easier to identify the number and average education level of workers in each
country of the world. Several data sources can be used to assess the size and skill structure
of the labor force of each country. The size of the working-age labor force (i.e. population
aged 25 and over) is provided by the United Nations. Data is missing for a few countries
but can be estimated using the CIA world factbook.8
Labor force data is then split across skill groups using international indicators of ed-
ucation attainment. Here, we follow Docquier and Marfouk (2006) and Docquier, Lowell
and Marfouk (2009) in combining di⁄erent data sets documenting the proportion of post-
secondary educated workers in the population aged 25 and over. They use De La Fuente and
Domenech (2006) for OECD countries and Barro and Lee (2001) for non-OECD countries.
For countries where Barro and Lee￿ s measures are missing, they estimate the proportions
educated using Cohen and Soto￿ s measures (see Cohen and Soto, 2007). In the remaining
countries where both Barro￿ Lee and Cohen￿ Soto data are missing (about 70 countries in
2000), they apply the educational proportions of the neighboring country having the closest
enrollment rate in secondary/tertiary education, or the closest GDP per capita.
3.3 Description and summary statistics for our sample
Table 1 shows the 1990-2000 ￿ ows of immigrants, emigrants and their di⁄erence (net mi-
gration) for a set of ten large Western European countries and four other groups: (i) three
Anglo-Saxon non-European countries (US, Canada and Australia) traditionally attracting
large numbers of immigrants, (ii) three large Eastern European countries (Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland) with a range of emigration rates, mostly to Western Europe, (iii) two
middle income countries with large emigration rates (Mexico and Turkey) and (iv) three
non-OECD countries with large immigration rates (Argentina, South Africa and Singapore).
We focus on the 1990-2000 ￿ ows for several reasons. First, they are the most recent ￿ ows
that one can construct for both immigration and emigration (based on censuses) hence their
skill composition and size is more relevant and possibly closer to later migration ￿ ows during
the 2000￿ s.9 One could also assess with our method the labor market impact of the total
stock of immigrants and emigrants across countries (reported for 1990 and 2000 in Table A3
of the Table Appendix). However the stock is accumulated over many decades and re￿ ects
migration that took place in the far past. Hence the migrant stock is less relevant to establish
recent labor market e⁄ects of immigration and emigration.
Several features of migration ￿ ows are worth emphasizing. First, the US, Canada and
Australia have much larger immigration (between 4.4 and 10.6%) than emigration (between
0.2 and 1.3%) rates among the highly educated portion of the labor force. The US is the
only country with a comparable rate of immigration of less educated (5.8%) while both the
immigration and emigration of low skilled is small in Canada and Australia. In Western
Europe, high skilled immigration rates range from 0.2% (Greece) to 8.5% (the UK) while
the emigration rates range between 1.1% (France and Germany) and 8.1% (Portugal). Em-
8See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook.
9Clearly it would be best to have the ￿ ow of migrants between 2000 and 2010 but this will be available
only in a few years as the Censuses from the 2010 round are collected, processed and made public.
10igration rates of the highly educated in Eastern Europe and in middle income countries can
be very high while the rate of immigration and emigration of the less educated is comparable.
Mexico is the main exception with signi￿cant emigration of less educated (7.8%) and mini-
mal immigration. Finally the non-OECD immigration-receiving countries have comparable
immigration and emigration rates, except for Singapore that has a very large in￿ ow of highly
educated workers.10
The picture emerging from a ￿rst glance at the data is that both the recent in￿ ow of
immigrants and out￿ ow of emigrants has a high-skill concentration greater than those of
native non-migrants for Western European countries as well as for the other rich countries
included as comparison. This con￿rms the data-based observation of Grogger and Han-
son (forthcoming) and of Docquier and Marfouk (2005) but is in sharp contrast with the
anecdotal image of unskilled immigrants ￿ ooding Western European labor markets. This
con￿ icting perception is mainly due to the fact that less educated migrants formed a smaller
share of the migrant ￿ ow than the corresponding group for the native labor force, but they
still outnumber the highly skilled migrants in absolute numbers. Hence the large number
of less educated immigrants stand out and attract the public attention in most European
countries. Germany is a good example to illustrate this point. Looking at the composition
of the migrant ￿ ow in the 1990s, the highly educated immigrants were 3.1% and the less
educated immigrants 2.2% of their respective groups in the domestic labor market. However
as 78% of the domestic labor force was less educated (and only 22% highly educated in 1990)
there were still twice as many less educated immigrants relative to highly educated ones.
Another important observation is that the recent ￿ ows are usually more educated when
compared with the stock of immigrants already present as of 1990 (see table A4). Hence, if
the impression on immigrants is based on the stock, rather than recent ￿ ows, there may be
a perception bias towards less educated migrants who possibly migrated long ago. Third,
in spite of the fact that census data are better than o¢ cial immigration data, they may
miss some undocumented migrants, especially in Western Europe. If those undocumented
migrants that are missing from the census data are mainly less educated, the actual numbers
of the less educated are understated by our data. We address this issue in section 5.1 by
using estimates on the extent of undocumented migration in di⁄erent destination countries.
Finally the perception of the skills of immigrants may be based on the occupations and
the labor market performance of immigrants (rather than their formal education) as analyzed
by Mattoo et.al. (2008) in the US labor market. In many cases, college educated immigrants
are less productive and take less skilled occupations than college educated natives since their
education quality, mostly obtained at home, might be less easily transferable or lower than
those of the natives in the destination. The lower quality/downgrading of education levels for
immigrants matter for our exercise as well. We address quality adjustment in the extensions
of our simulation exercise in section 5.2.
In terms of the overall picture of migration across countries in the world, the non-
European Anglo-Saxon countries (US, Canada, Australia) attract highly educated immi-
grants, from all over the world and their native-born citizens tend not to emigrate. Western
European countries seem to attract highly educated immigrants (from other European and
10See our discussion below on undocumented migration, which tends to be less skill intensive, and how we
try to account for this in our analysis.
11less developed countries) but also lose highly educated emigrants (to other OECD countries
and between each other). This is more similar to what happens to countries of intermedi-
ate income level that attract immigrants from poorer countries and send migrants to richer
countries. With these overall patterns in mind, we turn to the simulation exercise.
4 Simulated wage e⁄ects: basic speci￿cation
4.1 Parameterization
Our model allows us to calculate the wage e⁄ects of migration depending on the values of
three fundamental parameters ￿q; ￿I and ￿: We take a range of values from the literature.
Table 2 summarizes the values of the parameters chosen and the respective sources. We
would like to remind the reader that parameters ￿q and ￿s are set to 0:6 in all simulations.
This choice generates reasonable skill premia and wage di⁄erentials between natives and
immigrants when immigrants represent around 10 percent of the skill-speci￿c labor force.11
For the parameter ￿q there are several estimates in the literature. A group of in￿ uential
papers propose speci￿c estimated values for low, intermediate and high levels of substitution.
For instance Johnson (1970) and Murphy et al (1998) estimate values for ￿q around 1.30
(respectively 1.34 and 1.36); Ciccone and Peri (2005) and Krusell et al. (2000) estimate values
around 1.50 (respectively 1.50 and 1.66) and Ottaviano and Peri (forthcoming) estimate a
value close to 2.
The parameter ￿I has been the subject of several recent papers and has generated a
certain level of debate. This parameter is particularly relevant to determine the e⁄ect of
immigrants on wages of natives and, as we will see, the choice of this parameter makes some
di⁄erence in evaluating the e⁄ects of migration in certain countries. Borjas et al (2008) and
Ottaviano and Peri (forthcoming) use US data and Manacorda et al (forthcoming) use UK
data in their estimation.
Finally the parameter ￿, whose magnitude has been estimated using data from US cities
(Moretti 2004a, 2004b) or US states (Acemoglu and Angrist 2000 and Iranzo and Peri 2009)
is also subject to a certain level of disagreement between those who ￿nd substantial schooling
externalities and those who do not.
To preview the main features of the dependence of the simulated e⁄ects on parameter
values, ￿q has very little bearing on the impact of immigration and emigration on average
wages, but it is critical for the e⁄ects on the wage distribution between more and less
educated natives. The parameter ￿I in￿ uences the average wage impact of immigration on
natives but has no bearings on the impact of emigration. Finally ￿ matters for the impact
of immigration and emigration on average wages with no e⁄ect on the wage distribution.
4.2 Simulation with the basic speci￿cation
Table 3 and the three panels of Figure 1 show the long-run impact of immigration (dotted
line), emigration (dashed line)) and net migration (solid line) between 1990-2000 on average
11Those preference parameters play a minor role in our wage simulations. They enter both the numerator
and denominator in the expressions for percentage changes in wages and hence they canel out.
12wages (Panel 1a) as well as on the wages of highly educated (1b) and of less educated (1c)
non-migrants. All ￿gures are presented as percentage of the 2000 value of the respective wage
level. We have arranged countries starting with the non-European Anglo-Saxon on the left,
followed by the Western European, Eastern European countries and then, the countries of
emigration (Turkey and Mexico) and ￿nally the non-OECD countries. The graph provide a
clear visual impression that immigration has a positive average wage e⁄ect on non-migrants
(except for Argentina, the dotted line is always above zero) while emigration has a negative
average wage e⁄ect (the dashed line is always below zero). The e⁄ect of net migration
(combining immigrants and emigrants) on average wages is clearly positive for Canada,
Australia and Singapore, clearly negative for Portugal and Poland and usually negative but
not too large for the other Western European countries. Figure 1b shows that immigration
has usually a negative e⁄ect on wages of highly educated (except for the US), while emigration
has a positive e⁄ect on those wages. Finally Figure 1c shows the positive and sometimes
very large (in the case of Singapore and Australia) e⁄ect of immigration on wage of less
educated and the negative and also sometimes large (e.g. for Portugal, Greece and Poland)
e⁄ect of emigration on the wage of less educated workers.
Focusing on European countries, some patterns emerge clearly. First immigration has
either a null (Italy and Greece) or a positive e⁄ect on the average wage of natives, par-
ticularly sizeable for Sweden (+0.5%), the Netherlands (+0.5%) and the UK (+1.0%). At
the same time emigration has negative average wage e⁄ects for all European countries and
those are particularly large for Greece (-0.4%), the UK (-0.8%) and Portugal (-0.7%). As
a consequence, in countries where emigration is greater than immigration (such as Portugal
and Greece, but also in Italy during the considered period), non-migrants su⁄er net wage
losses. On the other hand, in countries of larger immigration (UK and France) non-migrants
bene￿t of the positive wage externalities from the arrival of highly educated immigrants.
Very interesting is also the e⁄ect of emigration on wage inequality. Emigration from Eu-
ropean countries has a much stronger e⁄ect on the less educated non-migrants whose wages,
for example, decline by 2.5%, 2.3% and 1.3% in the UK, Portugal and Greece, respectively.
As far as immigration is concerned, Table 3 shows that recent immigration ￿ ows are usu-
ally more education-intensive in many countries. Hence, immigration substantially helps the
wages of low-educated British workers (+2.8%), so that in net, they gain from international
mobility. Low-skilled workers in Sweden and Netherlands also experience signi￿cant gains
from immigration. However, the gains from immigration in Portugal and Greece do not
compensate the losses from emigration and the low-skilled workers su⁄er considerable net
losses of -2.1 and -1.3%, respectively.
We report the e⁄ects of immigration, emigration and net migration also for the aggregate
EU15, considered as one country, in Table 1 and Figure 1. These ￿gures ignore intra-EU15
mobility and only consider the overall e⁄ect of immigration from and emigration to the rest
of the world on the aggregate EU15 economy. As a whole, EU15 is much less open to labor
movements than some of its countries. Immigration levels for both the high-skilled (2.6%)
and the low-skilled (1.4%) are higher when compared to the emigration levels (0.9 and -
0.4% respectively) but the net migration levels are almost identical across the education
levels. Emigration, which exhibits strong positive selection, has a negative e⁄ect of 0.2%
on average wages while immigration, also positively selected relative to non-migrants, has a
positive e⁄ect of equal magnitude. Even more remarkably, less educated European workers
13experience a 0.5% wage increase due to immigration into EU15 and a 0.6% wage decrease
due to emigration out of EU15 to the rest of the world.
What is the channel through which less educated natives lose as a result of emigration?
The emigration of engineers, teachers and scientists (highly educated) implies that fewer
high-tech companies, schools and research laboratories operate, leading to lower demand for
construction workers, assistants and lab technicians (less educated). The supply of highly
educated creates demand for the complementary less educated workers and loss of the ￿rst
group decrease the demand and, in the long-run, the wages of the latter group. Interestingly,
the pattern in European countries is similar to what happens in Poland, Mexico and South
Africa. The reverse takes place in Canada and Australia where immigration strongly helps
the wages of less educated (+3.3 and +4.5% respectively). In the US, we see very small
e⁄ects on wages of less educated (-0.4%) and highly educated (+0.3%).
4.3 Robustness checks
Figure 2, 3 and 4 show various sensitivity analyses for a range of parameter values. Following
the speci￿c values presented in Table 2, Figures 2, 3 and 4 show the variation in our results
when we vary the values of ￿q, ￿I and ￿, respectively. For purposes of clarity, we only
represent the wage e⁄ect of immigration and emigration leaving aside the net e⁄ect (which
is approximately the sum of the two).
Figure 2a shows that the sensitivity of the average wage e⁄ect to changes in ￿q is quite
minimal. The simulated lines are almost completely overlapping, indicating that the aver-
age wage e⁄ects of immigration and emigration do not critically depend on the elasticity of
substitution between more and less educated workers in the labor force. What depends on
this parameter, however, as shown by ￿gure 2b and 2c are the distributional e⁄ects - wage
e⁄ects for non-migrants with di⁄erent education levels. Higher values of ￿q imply closer sub-
stitutability between more and less educated workers and this reduces the negative (positive)
e⁄ect of immigration (emigration) on the wages of highly educated. At ￿q = 2; the positive
e⁄ect of emigration on highly educated wages is almost eliminated and the negative e⁄ect
of immigration is turned into a small positive e⁄ect due to the imperfect substitution and
positive externality of immigrants. For the wages of less educated non-migrants, on the other
hand, higher substitutability of more and less educated workers reduces both the positive
e⁄ect of immigration and (in absolute value) the negative e⁄ect of emigration. However,
even at ￿q = 2; there are clear wage gains from immigration and clear wage losses from
emigration for less educated non-migrants. This is due to the fact that for less educated
workers, the wage e⁄ects (operating through skill-complementarities, schooling externalities
and imperfect substitution with immigrants) go in the same direction - they are positive for
immigration and negative for emigration. Hence even when we reduce the strength of the
skill-complementarity channel via increasing ￿q, the other two channels remain strong and
of opposite direction for immigration and emigration on less educated wages. For the more
educated workers, on the other hand, reducing the schooling-complementarity channel in-
creases the relative importance of schooling externalities and of the imperfect substitutability
between native and immigrants. These last two e⁄ects are positive and, for high values of
￿q, may prevail generating null or positive overall e⁄ects of immigration on highly educated.
With these mechanisms in mind, we can also easily understand and interpret the sensi-
14tivity analysis of the parameter ￿I performed in Figure 3. First, we should note that this
parameter, as expected, has no impact on how emigration a⁄ects average or skill-speci￿c
wages. All of the lines in all three panels for emigration are perfectly overlapping. As the
substitutability between natives and immigrants decreases, on the other hand, the average
wage e⁄ects of immigration become stronger and more positive for every country in the sam-
ple. Intuitively this occurs because the in￿ ow of immigrants is more bene￿cial to natives￿
wages when the two groups are more complementary with each other. Interestingly when
￿I = 6 (based on Manacorda et al., forthcoming) immigration implies wage bene￿ts for both
more and less educated in most of the countries. In some countries, such as Canada, Aus-
tralia, the UK and even more Singapore, the positive average wage impact of immigrants is
quite large, in the order of 2, 3 and even 5%.12
Finally, Figure 4 shows the sensitivity to the schooling externality and reveals some in-
teresting e⁄ects. First, when we completely eliminate this channel (￿ = 0), the average wage
e⁄ects of emigration become essentially zero while the e⁄ects of immigration on non-migrant
wages stay positive, driven by imperfect substitution as discussed above. If we increase the
value and e⁄ect of ￿, the average wage e⁄ect of immigration also increases with signi￿cant
positive e⁄ect on the less-educated and lower negative e⁄ect on the highly educated workers,
o⁄-setting the negative impact on highly educated due to the skill-complementarity channel.
The robustness checks show that essentially for the whole parameter range, immigration
has a positive e⁄ect on average wages of non-migrants for most considered countries. For most
European countries, it is positive or, in some cases, zero for the extreme parameter values.
On the other hand, emigration has an e⁄ect that ranges from 0 to negative depending on
parameter values. For all the Western European countries considered the e⁄ect of emigration
are always negative. The winners from immigration are, for Europe, the less educated native
workers while the losers from immigration are the more educated. For this group, however,
the wage losses are signi￿cantly reduced and also turned into gain if (i) the elasticity between
more and less educated is at the high end of the spectrum, (ii) the elasticity between natives
and immigrants is at the low end or (iii) if the schooling externality is at the high end of the
spectrum. Average wages and wages of he less educated seem to bene￿t from immigration
and su⁄er from emigration in all simulations for all European countries.
4.4 Best-case and worst-case scenarios
Previous sections presented the wage e⁄ect of immigration and emigration for a wide range
of critical parameter values (￿q;￿I;￿) as identi￿ed in the literature (see Table 2). Figure 5
shows the estimated average wage e⁄ect of immigration (panel 5a) and emigration (panel
5b) for non-migrants considering the con￿gurations of the parameters that produce the
most and the least bene￿cial wage e⁄ect on natives. In particular, the combination of
parameters producing the most bene￿cial wage e⁄ects of immigration on non-migrants is:
￿q = 1:3;￿I = 6;￿ = 0:75; while the con￿guration producing the least bene￿cial e⁄ect is
￿q = 2;￿I = 1;￿ = 0: For emigration, the worst case scenario is reached when ￿q = 1:3;￿ =
0:75 and the best case scenario when ￿q = 2; ￿ = 0 independently from the value of ￿I:
12With imperfect substitution between natives and immigrants, new immigrants bene￿t native workers in
the host country. They compete, however, more directly with previous immigrants. However their wages are
not included in the simulated e⁄ects for national non-migrants.
15As far as immigration is concerned, the ￿ Worst-case￿e⁄ect is essentially equal to zero
for all countries whereas the ￿ Best-case￿e⁄ect is positive everywhere. The largest gains are
obtained for Singapore (+3.7%), Australia (+2.6%), Canada (+1.9%) and the UK (+1.7%).
The opposite picture emerges with regard to emigration. The ￿ Best-case￿e⁄ect is essentially
equal to zero for all countries whereas the ￿ Worst-case￿e⁄ect is negative everywhere. The
largest losses are obtained for the UK (-1.3%), Portugal (-1.1%), Poland (-0.9%), Singapore
and South Africa (-0.8%), Greece and Canada (-0.7%). For EU15 as a whole the best case
scenario for immigration implies a gain around 0.5% of non movers￿wages. On the other
hand the worst-case scenario implies a loss from emigration also around -0.5% of non movers￿
wage.
5 Simulated wage e⁄ects: extensions
The parametrization of our model re￿ ects di⁄erent results on the impact of immigration,
schooling externalities, and the substitutability between highly educated and less educated
workers. However our analysis of the wage e⁄ects of immigration can be seen as somewhat
optimistic. First, our database may not capture illegal immigration to the OECD countries,
which is widely believed to be low-skill intensive. Second, it assumes that highly educated
immigrants are homogeneous across origin countries and contribute the same skills as native
highly educated workers to the destination labor markets. Finally, we did not include yet the
potential congestion e⁄ects of immigration on the labor market of receiving countries, nor
did we examine the short-run e⁄ects accounting for sluggish adjustment of physical capital
to immigrants. This section deals with those issues and extends our robustness analysis.
5.1 Accounting for undocumented immigrants
By focusing on census data, our database fails to record undocumented immigrants in most
countries, for whom systematic statistics by education level and country of birth are not
available. An exception is the United States where demographic evidence indicates that
most residents, regardless of legal status, are identi￿ed in the census. However, other host
countries provide no accurate data about the size and educational status of undocumented
migrants. In their recent report, Kovacheva and Vogel (2009) estimate the size of irregular
migrant populations in the European Union and in selected member states. Annex 1 of
their paper provides lower and upper bounds for the proportion of undocumented in the
immigrant population in 2002.13 Data are available the for the 10 European countries in
our sample - Belgium (11-18%), France (9-15%), Germany (14-20%), Greece (42-63%), Italy
(53-75%), Netherlands (11-26%), Portugal (18-89%), Spain (8-29%), Sweden (1.7-2.5%), and
the U.K. (11-21%).
Figure 6 gives the e⁄ect of immigration on average wages when illegal immigration is taken
into account where the ￿ Lower Bound￿and ￿ Upper Bound￿scenarios use the proportions listed
above. Although there may be some instances of highly skilled undocumented migrants (such
as those overstaying their H-1B visas in the United States), the majority of undocumented
migrants are believed to be low-skilled. Hence, we make the two extreme assumptions that
13See http://irregular-migration.hwwi.net/Stock_estimates.6170.0.html.
16(i) all undocumented immigrants as measured in the early 2000￿ s are less educated and
that (ii) they migrated to the destination country between 1990 and 2000. Our simulation
uses the baseline set of elasticities of Table 3. Hence the solid line in Figure 6 corresponds
to our baseline simulation depicted on Figure 1 Panel 1a. In the original scenario, the
e⁄ect of immigration is positive or nil in all EU countries. Adding illegal immigration
(see dashed and dotted lines) slightly modi￿es our conclusions only in countries where the
proportion of illegal immigrants is very large (above 50 percent). Hence, Greece and Italy
now su⁄er small immigration costs (0.2 and 0.1%, respectively), while the e⁄ect for the
Netherlands turns to zero in the ￿ Upper Bound￿scenario. The change is obviously driven by
the adverse e⁄ect on less educated non-migrants. Most of the countries however (such as UK,
Belgium, France, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden) maintain a positive wage e⁄ect
of immigration even under the most pessimistic scenario which is likely to largely overestimate
the undocumented. In summary, only Italy and Greece su⁄ered a (small) negative wage e⁄ect
from immigration even after adding the highest estimates of undocumented immigrants and
counting all of them as less educated.
5.2 Accounting for the quality of education and skill downgrading
Simulations presented in Section 4 account for potential complementarity between natives
and foreign workers in each skill category. Such imperfect substitutability emerge because
immigrants have di⁄erent motivations, culture-speci￿c skills and limits compared to natives.
Another source of heterogeneity between immigrants and natives arises from the absence
of equivalence between national and foreign degrees both in terms of quality and subject
coverage (such as the case in law degrees). In particular, highly educated immigrants trained
in developing countries could be less productive in high-skill jobs than natives with similar
educational degrees.
Evidence of such heterogeneity in the quality of education is provided by Coulombe
and Tremblay (2009), who compare the skill intensity and schooling levels of Canadian
immigrants and natives who were both submitted to standardized tests in literacy, math,
and problem solving. These tests provide measures of pro￿ciency that are comparable across
countries and over time. On this basis, Coulombe and Tremblay estimate a ￿ skill-schooling
gap￿for each origin country, de￿ned as the di⁄erence between the mean years of schooling of
the immigrant subgroup and the typical native with the same pro￿ciency level. A positive
skill-schooling gap of n years means that Canadian nationals with y years of schooling are as
productive as immigrants with y+n years of schooling. The larger the skill-schooling gap, the
lower is the quality of education in the country of origin. Simple bivariate OLS regressions
show that the skill-schooling gap is a decreasing function of per capita income of the origin
country. Their -0.10 point estimate of the slope coe¢ cient indicates that the skill-schooling
gap is one year smaller when per capita income increases by US$10 000 in the origin country.
Using this estimate and cross-country data on per capita income, we construct an indicator
of skill-schooling gap for each origin country. Then, assuming that one year of schooling
generates a productivity gain of 8 percent, we estimate the relative productivity of educated
immigrants and natives in each country, with a benchmark value of one for workers trained
in Canada (as well as workers trained in richer origin countries, i.e. the upper bound of
this index is one). For example, college graduate immigrants from Angola and Portugal are
17equivalent to 0.73 and 0.85 Canadian college graduates, respectively.
We revisit the wage e⁄ect of immigration on average wages when the skill levels of im-
migrants and nationals are quality-adjusted. Di⁄erences in the quality of education is likely
to be a source of ￿ brain waste￿(see Matoo et al, 2008). Hence, our adjustment consists in
multiplying the number of college graduates originating from a given country by the relative
productivity index computed for that country, and consider the remaining fraction as less
educated workers. In the previous example a college graduate from Angola is considered as
a combination of 0.73 college graduates and 0.27 non-college graduates in the rich country.
This method has two main limitations. First, as our adjustment factor is based on Cana-
dian data, it su⁄ers from a selection bias. Indeed, Moroccan migrants to Canada are more
than likely to have higher skills than Moroccan migrants to France. For this reason, we
also provide a second simulation with a correction based on the squared of the Canadian
index. Coming back to our example above, one college graduate immigrant from Angola or
Portugal accounts for 0.51 or 0.72 units of highly skilled workers, respectively. Second, while
our benchmark non-adjusted measure implies that immigrants￿human capital is equivalent
to that of natives (as if all migrants were trained in the host country), our adjusted mea-
sure implies that all immigrants were trained in their birth country. Reality is obviously
somewhere in between. However our only objective here is to explore whether a correction
for education quality can modify our predictions, hence an extremely negative assumption
implies simply that our estimate is a lower bound of the wage e⁄ect.
Our third correction in the accounting of foreign-born highly educated is based on the
US wage of immigrants from each country of origin (in year 2000). We calculate the weekly
wage of college educated immigrants from country j as a linear combination of the wages of
US-born college educated and non college educated workers. We then use those weights to
distribute a highly educated foreign-born between more and less educated US equivalents.
With this method, for instance, a highly educated Vietnamese is considered as equivalent to
0.73 units of US college graduate and 0.27 units of US less educated. If foreign-born college
educated migrants from a certain country are paid more than US born they are considered
pure college equivalent.
Our fourth and ￿nal correction is based on Mattoo et.al (2008) who calculate the prob-
ability that an immigrant from country j with tertiary education (completed at home prior
to migration) obtains a skilled job in the US labor market. Using the data from 1990 and
2000 censuses and controlling for individual factors (such as age, experience and years since
migration), they calculate these probabilities for hypothetical individuals identical in every
respect except their origin country. They ￿nd that migrants from South Asia perform very
well while those from Eastern Europe and Latin America are placed in relatively unskilled
jobs.
The results from all of the four corrections are reported in Figure 7. Some corrections
imply smaller gains for host countries (especially for the US, Canada, Australia and Sin-
gapore) The largest change, relative to the baseline, is for the US where we now observe a
loss of around 0.2% in average wages due to ten year of immigration, which is still a small
percentage. The corrections do not change the overall picture and the a positive impact of
immigration in most European countries is maintained. The limit of all corrections is that,
for data limitations, they are all based on schooling quality and labor market assessment of
immigrants in Canada or the US and not in European countries.
185.3 Accounting for density/crowding externalities
An additional aggregate e⁄ect of immigration may stem from its impact on the aggregate
scale of production. On one hand, the existence of a ￿xed factor in production (such as land)
would cause aggregate decreasing returns. On the other hand, the e¢ ciency of production
may be increased by an increase in employment density due to "agglomeration externalities"
as in Ciccone and Hall (1986). In general agglomeration externalities/crowding e⁄ects can
be modeled by assuming that the TFP is also as function of the aggregate scale of production












In this expression, the crowding e⁄ect of labor force size on land, assuming a share of land
in production of 0:03 in rich countries (see Ciccone and Hall 1986) would give ￿ = ￿0:03 .
On the other hand, incorporation of the positive density externalities estimated by Ciccone
and Hall (1986) would lead to a positive value of ￿ = 0:06:14 We explore the implication of
such e⁄ects for the impact of immigration, keeping the values of the other parameters at the
basic speci￿cation.
Figure 8 illustrates the estimates in the benchmark case and compares with either type of
externality. Since the values of the estimates for the parameter ￿ and the e⁄ect of emigration
in changing total employment (and its density) are small, the e⁄ects of introducing this
externality (either positive or negative) are also minimal. The presence of an agglomeration
externality would marginally increase the positive average wage e⁄ects of immigrants, while
the crowding externality would marginally reduce it but the di⁄erences are on the order of
a small fraction of a percentage point.
5.4 Accounting for employment rates
While the model is based on employment the empirical analysis is based on working-age
population data. As reduced labor market participation of immigrants and/or natives may
alter the wage e⁄ect of immigration (see Angrist and Kugler 2003, or D￿ Amuri et al 2010)
it is important to check whether excluding from the analysis non-employed natives and
immigrants a⁄ects our predictions.
Using the European Labor Force Survey, we correct the size of each skill group (highly and
less educated natives and immigrants) for their employment/population ratio as of year 2000.
If these employment rates are identical across the four groups, the results would not change
at all. If they are very di⁄erent between natives and immigrants, they may imply di⁄erences
in relative employment e⁄ects for given population sizes. While employment/population
ratios may di⁄er across countries what matters for our wage e⁄ects is their within country
di⁄erence across the four skill groups described above. Figure 9 shows the simulated wage
14Notice that we simply model the density e⁄ect as depending on average density: total population
divided by area. The fact that immigrants move mainly into cities that are already dense should increase
even further the e⁄ect, if one uses the exact Ciccone and Hall (1996) index that counts density in cities
(where most population lives) as more relevant.
19e⁄ects using employment data (obtained applying group-speci￿c employment-population ra-
tios) relative to the baseline case calculated with population data. The new estimates are
hardly distinguishable from the baseline case. This is because while the employment rate is
somewhat di⁄erent between highly and less educated, they are very similar for native and
immigrants for the same education levels in most countries. In some countries immigrants
have in fact slightly higher employment rates than natives. In most countries less educated
immigrants have a somewhat smaller employment rate than corresponding natives. This is
true in particular for Spain and Sweden where the low employment rate of highly skilled
immigrants (relative to natives) reduces the positive wage e⁄ects of immigration but only
slightly.
5.5 Accounting for physical capital sluggishness (short-run e⁄ects)
While the model has, so far, evaluated the long-run e⁄ects of immigrants and emigrants, by
assuming full capital adjustment, we can also calculate the short-run e⁄ects by accounting
for imperfect capital adjustment. From the production function in (3) we can obtain the
compensation to the composite factor Q, w
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where ￿t = Kt=Qt approximates the capital-labor ratio. In balanced growth path (or in an










Hence the average wage in the balanced growth path (aggregating immigrants and natives)
depends only on total factor productivity, e A and on the rate of return of capital and not on
the total labor supply Qt: In the short run, however, the percentage change in average wages
may depend on the percentage response of ￿t to immigration. Taking the di⁄erential of the





















where (￿￿t=￿t)immigration is the percentage deviation of the capital-labor ratio from ￿￿
t
due to immigration, while
￿
￿ e At= e At
￿
immigration
is the productivity e⁄ect (if any) from im-
migrants. With full capital adjustment and the economy on the balanced growth path,
(￿￿t=￿t)immigration equals 0 and the only average wage e⁄ect of immigrants is through e At
15.
At the opposite extreme, with ￿xed total capital, Kt = K; then (￿￿t=￿t)immigration equals
the negative percentage change of labor supply due to immigration: ￿￿It
Qt , where ￿It is the
net change in foreign-born workers and Qt is, approximately, the aggregate labor supply at
the beginning of the period. While for short periods or for sudden shocks the short run
15Obviously immigration has also an e⁄ect on relative wages of native-immigrants and highly-less educated
as shown above. Physical capital, however, only a⁄ects the average wage and hence we can simply add this
e⁄ect to the group-speci￿c wage e⁄ect.
20e⁄ect may be evaluated considering capital as ￿xed in the case of ten years of immigration,
which is a slow and continued phenomenon, we need to account explicitly for the dynamics
of capital.
A popular way to analyze the deviation of ln(￿t) from its balanced growth path trend,
used in the growth and business cycle literature, is to represent its time-dynamics in the
following way:











; and the term ￿1 ln(￿t￿1) captures the sluggishness of yearly capital adjust-
ment. The parameter (1 ￿ ￿1) is commonly called the ￿speed of adjustment ￿since it is
the share of the deviation from the balanced growth path (trend) eliminated each year. Fi-
nally, ￿It
Qt represents the yearly immigration ￿ ows as share of the labor force and "t are other
mean-zero uncorrelated shocks. Once we know ￿1, ￿ and the sequence of yearly immigration
￿ ows, ￿It
Qt ; we can use (14) to obtain an impulse response of ln(￿t) as of 2000 in deviation
from its trend (short run). This in turn allows us to correct the average wage e⁄ect (cur-
rently determined only by the productivity e⁄ect of immigration and emigration) for this
sluggish capital adjustment and to obtain the short-run e⁄ect on the average wage of non-
migrants. The empirical growth literature (Islam, 1995; Caselli et al., 1996) and the business
cycle literature (Romer, 2006, Chapter 4), provide model-based and empirical estimates of
￿1. The recent growth literature usually estimates a 10% speed of convergence of capital
to the own balanced growth path for advanced (OECD) economies (Islam, 1995; Caselli et
al., 1996), implying ￿1 = 0:9: Similarly, the business cycle literature calculates the speed
of convergence of capital to be between 10% and 20% in each year (Romer, 2006, Chapter
4) for closed economies, and even faster rates for open economies. Hence ￿1 = 0:9 seems a
reasonable estimate (if anything on the sluggish side).
We use the immigration and emigration rates over 1990-2000 for the considered countries,
and assume a uniform distribution of migration ￿ ows over the ten years. We adopt as
parameters of capital adjustment ￿1 = 0:9 and ￿ = ￿0:9 (assuming that capital adjustment
begins the same year as immigrants are received or emigrant lost). Hence the recursive
equation (14) allows us to calculate (￿￿1990￿2000=￿1990)migration as of year 2000. Using formula
(13) we can calculate the e⁄ect of ￿￿ on the average wage and by adding this to the baseline
average wage estimate for non-movers we obtain the short-run e⁄ects of immigration and
emigration. We report the simulated short-run e⁄ect (together with the long-run e⁄ects
from the baseline case) in Figure 10. Such a short-run correction, driven by sluggish capital
adjustment, is usually negative for immigrants and positive for emigrants. The largest value
of the short-run correction for immigration is -0.9% for the US average wage, as this country
has by far the largest immigration rate over the period. Several other countries (such as
Mexico, Hungary and Czech Republic) have a correction term for immigrants close to 016.
For Europe the largest short-run adjustments in average wages due to capital sluggishness
are for Sweden (-0.48%) and for Spain (-0.55%). The smallest are for France (-0.14%) and for
16In terms of net ￿ ows of immigrants, during the 90￿ s the largest yearly in￿ ows were in Spain, at 0.2% of
the labor force in each year and the smallest were in Greece at 0.02% of the labor force per year.
21Greece (-0.04%). For emigration, except for Mexico that has a very large and positive short-
run correction, due to a very large emigration rate (1.2% per year in the period considered),
the other corrections are very small. Figure 10 shows the simulation of short-run e⁄ects vis-
a-vis the long run e⁄ects of immigration and emigration on average wages for the baseline
scenario. Combining imperfect capital adjustment with the long-run e⁄ects, we still have
positive short-run average wage e⁄ects of immigration on non-migrants in four European
countries. In the UK, France, Netherlands and Sweden immigration had a positive e⁄ects on
average native wages already in the short-run. For Greece, Italy, Portugal and Belgium the
short-run e⁄ects on average wages are negative and very small (less than -0.2% in absolute
value). For Germany and Spain they are negative and between -0.27 and -0 35%. The same
countries experienced a long-run increase in their average wage due to immigrants equal to
0.20%. Hence, even in the short run, accounting for sluggish capital adjustment we do not
￿nd much of a negative average wage e⁄ect of immigration. As for emigration the short-
run e⁄ects are smaller in absolute value but still negative for seven European countries and
for the EU15 as a whole. Even in the short run in most European countries the e⁄ect of
emigration is negative and larger in absolute value than the e⁄ect of immigration. Both of
them, however, are rather small in the order of few tenths of a percentage points. Even in the
short run and accounting for the slow adjustment of capital immigration has a very moderate
e⁄ect, usually close to zero and, if negative, smaller (for seven countries out of ten) than the
e⁄ect of emigration. Not even in a short-run perspective did immigration have a signi￿cant
negative impact on native wages for European countries. To the contrary emigration did
not produce any short-run gains for native wages that may reduce the welfare cost of the
long-run losses.
6 Conclusions
Immigrants are highly visible to the governments and public in destination countries espe-
cially in times of economic anxiety and high unemployment levels. They are also relatively
easy to measure by statistical agencies of the host countries through censuses, population
and labor force surveys. On the other hand emigrants are much less visible to governments
of their birth countries and less known to the general public. There is no mandatory regis-
tration for those who leave a country, they are dispersed in many receiving countries and no
statistical agency keeps detailed records of all its emigrants and returnees. There is rarely
a policy instrument that can a⁄ect emigration since freedom of movement allows people to
leave any democratic country.
During the last decades emigration has been considered mostly in connection with poor
countries and usually in the context of brain drain. There have been studies on the labor
market impact of immigration in the destination since the 1970s. However, only very recently
and only in connection with the debate on brain drain and brain gain, some economists have
began to measure empirically the aggregate income e⁄ects of emigration (Beine et.al. 2008).
This paper uses a recently constructed database on emigration ￿ ows by schooling level be-
tween 1990 and 2000, constructed using data across all countries in the world. Using a range
of parameters and an aggregate representation of labor markets of receiving countries, we
show that residents of Western European countries experienced wage gains, on average, from
22immigration while they experienced wage losses due to emigration. The magnitude of the
wage losses due to emigration is roughly equal to or larger than the gains from immigration.
This is due to the fact that both immigrants and emigrants in European countries are, on
average, more educated relative to non-migrants. Moreover immigrants are generally imper-
fect substitutes for non-migrants bringing skills that only partially compensate the losses
due to emigration. Our analysis also ￿nds that immigration in Europe was somewhat more
bene￿cial to the less educated natives, reducing their wage gap with highly educated, while
the opposite is true of emigration. These surprising results imply that several European
countries should begin to discuss more seriously the causes and e⁄ects of their signi￿cant
emigration rates, especially of their highly educated professionals, rather than obsessing with
immigration that has mostly been bene￿cial in economic terms.
23A Data appendix
Migration data presented in Section 3 follow Docquier et al. (2010) who construct compre-
hensive 195x195 matrices of bilateral migration stocks. These matrices cover the two skill
groups (college graduates and less educated individuals), and two years (1990 and 2000).
Migration is de￿ned on the basis of country of birth which is time invariant (contrary to the
concept of citizenship, which changes with naturalization) and independent of the changes
in policies regarding naturalization. However, this de￿nition does not account for whether
education has been acquired in the home or in the host country. This induces a potential
over-estimation of the intensity of the brain drain migration of children and students can
represent an important fraction of total immigration for certain countries.17
The methodology is described in detail in Docquier et al. (2010) and it consists of three
main steps. The starting point (step 1) is the database described in Docquier, Lowell and
Marfouk (2009) documenting bilateral migration stocks in OECD host countries. It is based
on a collection of census and register immigration data by country of birth and educational
level in the 30 OECD countries in 1990 and 2000. This OECD set of destinations does not
include the three member states which joined the OECD in 2010 (Chile, Israel and Slovenia)
and future members (Estonia and Russia). This database characterizes the education level,
origin and destination of about 57.4 million migrants in 2000 and 40.8 million migrants
in 1990. High-skill migration represents 35.4 percent of the total in 2000 (30.1 percent in
1990). The second step consists of a collection of similar immigration data from 46 non-
OECD destinations in 2000 and 31 destinations in 1990. In the third step, data collected
in steps 1 and 2 are used to estimate the determinants of the size of bilateral migration
(Ms
ijt) from country i to country j in the education group s at year t. Then, based on these
estimations, the size of the migrant stock from each origin country to the remaining 119
non-OECD host countries in 2000 (and 134 in 1990) for each education level is predicted.
The ￿nal 195x195 database combines recorded migration stocks (when census and register
data are available) and out-of-sample predictions (when o¢ cial statistics are missing).
Table A1 provides summary statistics for migration stocks which are comparable with
labor force data. The database characterizes the origin, destination and education level of
about 100.5 million adult migrants in 2000, and 80.2 million in 1990. Table A2 distinguishes
observed and imputed values for immigrants to countries included in our sample. Table A3
shows stock of immigrants and emigrants in 1990 and 2000 as percentage of the skill-speci￿c
labor force. Table A4 describes the distribution of the labor force between college graduates
and less educated as percentage of total.
17Beine et al (2007) have estimated the age-of-entry structure of high-skill immigration and proposed
alternative measures of the brain drain excluding those who left their home country before age 12, 18 or 22.
The corrected rates are obviously lower than those calculated without age-of-entry restrictions. However,
the correlation between corrected and uncorrected rates is extremely high and the country rankings by brain
drain intensities are basically una⁄ected by the correction. This should mitigate concerns about children
migration possibly leading to cross-sectional biases in the brain drain estimates.
24References
[1] Acemoglu, Daron, and Joshua Angrist (2000). How large are human capital externali-
ties? Evidence from compulsory schooling laws.
NBER Macroeconomic Annual 15.
[2] Acemoglu, Daron, and Fabrizio Zilibotti (2001). Productivity Di⁄erences. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 116 (2): 563-606.
[3] Angrist, Joshua D. (1995). The Economic Returns to Schooling in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip. American Economic Review 85 (5): 1065-1087.
[4] Angrist, Joshua, and Adriana D. Kugler (2003). Protective or counter-productive?
Labour market institutions and the e⁄ect of immigration on EU natives. Economic
Journal 113, F302-F331.
[5] Azariadis, Costas, and Allan Drazen (1990). Threshold externalities in economic devel-
opment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105 (2): 501-526.
[6] Barro, Robert J., and Jong-Wha Lee (2001). International data on educational attain-
ment: Updates and implications. Oxford Economic Papers 53: 541￿ 563.
[7] Beine, M., F. Docquier and C. Ozden (forthcoming), "Diasporas," Journal of Develop-
ment Economics
[8] Beine, M., F. Docquier and H. Rapoport (2001), Brain Drain and Economic Growth:
Theory and Evidence, Journal of Development Economics 64 (1), 275-289.
[9] Beine M., Docquier, F. and H. Rapoport (2008), Brain Drain and Human Capital
Formation in Developing Countries: Winners and Losers, Economic Journal, 118, 631-
652.
[10] Benhabib, Jess, and Mark M. Spiegel (2005). Human Capital and Technology Di⁄usion.
In Ph. Aghion and S. Durlauf (eds.), Handbook of Economic Growth, Elsevier: Vol. 1,
Chapter 13, 935-966.
[11] Borjas, George. 2003. The Labor Demand Curve is Downward Sloping: Reexamining
the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118,
no. 4: 1335-1374.
[12] Borjas, George (2009). The Analytics of the Wage E⁄ect of Immigration. NBER Working
Papers 14796.
[13] Borjas, George, and Lawrence Katz. 2007. The Evolution of the Mexican-Born Work-
force in the United States. In: Borjas, George (Ed), Mexican Immigration to the United
States National Bureau of Economic Research Conference Report, Cambridge, MA.
25[14] Borjas, George, Je⁄rey Grogger, and Gordon Hanson (2008). Imperfect Substitution be-
tween Immigrants and Natives: A Reappraisal. National Bureau of Economic Research,
Working Paper # 13887, Cambridge, MA.
[15] Card, David (2005). Is the new immigration really so bad?. Economic Journal 115 (4):
300-323.
[16] Card, David (2009). Immigration and inequality. American Economic Review 99 (2):
1-21.
[17] Card, David, and Thomas Lemieux (2001). Can Falling Supply Explain the Rising
Returns to College for Younger Men? A Cohort Based Analysis. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 116 (2): 705-746.
[18] Caselli, Francesco, Gerardo Esquivel, and Fernando Lefort. 1996. Reopening the Con-
vergence Debate; A New Look at Cross-Country Growth Empirics. Journal of Economic
Growth 1, no.3: 363-389.
[19] Caselli, Francesco, and Wilbur Coleman (2006). The World Technology Frontier. Amer-
ican Economic Review 96 (3): 499-522.
[20] Ciccone Antonio, and Robert E. Hall (1996). Productivity and the Density of Economic
Activity. American Economic Review 86 (1): 54-70.
[21] Ciccone Antonio and Giovanni Peri (2005) "Long-Run Substitutability between More
and Less Educated Workers: Evidence from U.S. States 1950-1990" (with Antonio Ci-
ccone) Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 87, Issue 4, pages 652-663.
[22] Ciccone Antonio and Giovanni Peri (2006) ￿Identifying Human Capital Externalities:
Theory with Applications￿Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 73, pp. 381-412.
[23] Coe, David T., Elhanan Helpman, and Alexander W. Ho⁄maister (1997). North-South
R&D spillovers. Economic Journal 107 (440): 134-149.
[24] Cohen, Daniel, and Marcelo Soto (2007). Growth and human capital: Good data, good
results. Journal of Economic Growth 12 (1): 51-76.
[25] Coulombe, Serge, and Jean-Fran￿ois Tremblay (2009). Migration and skills disparities
across the Canadian provinces. Regional Studies 43 (1): 5-18.
[26] D￿ Amuri, Francesco, Gianmarco I.P. Ottaviano, and Giovanni Peri (2010). The labor
market impact of immigration in Western Germany in the 1990s. European Economic
Review 54, 550-570.
[27] Docquier, FrØdØric, B. Lindsay Lowell, and Abdeslam Marfouk (2009). A gendered as-
sessment of highly skilled emigration. Population and Development Review 35 (2): 297-
321.
26[28] Docquier, FrØdØric, Abdeslam Marfouk, Caglar Ozden, and Christopher R. Parsons
(2010). Geographic, gender and skill structure of international migration. Report written
for the Economic Research Forum.
[29] Easterly, William, and Ross Levine (2001). What have we learned from a decade of
empirical research on growth? It￿ s Not Factor Accumulation: Stylized Facts and Growth
Models. World Bank Economic Review 15 (2): 177-219.
[30] Iranzo, Susana, and Giovanni Peri (2009). Migration and Trade: Theory with an Appli-
cation to the Eastern-Western European Integration. CReAM Discussion Paper Series
0905.
[31] Johnson, George E. (1970). The Demand for Labor by Educational Category. Southern
Economic Journal, 37: 190-203.
[32] Katz, Larry, and Kevin Murphy (1992). Changes in Relative Wages 1963-1987: Supply
and Demand Factors. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (1): 35-78.
[33] Krusell Per, Lee E. Ohanian, JosØ-Victor Rios-Rull and Giovanni L. Violante (2000).
Capital-Skill Complementarity and inequality: A Macroeconomic Analysis. Economet-
rica 68: 1029-53.
[34] Goldin, Claudia and Larry Katz (2008). The Race Between Education and Technology.
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2008.
[35] Grogger, Je⁄rey and Gordon Hanson (forthcoming) "Income Maximization and the
Selection and Sorting of International Migrants," Journal of Development Economics,
forthcoming.
[36] Islam, Nasrul. 1995. Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach. Quarterly Journal of
Economics 110, no.4: 1127-1170.
[37] Kovacheva, Vesela, and Dita Kogel (2009). The size of the irregular foreign resident
population in the European Union in 2002, 2005 and 2008: aggregate estimates. HWWI
Working paper n. 4/2009 (Hamburg Institute of International Economics).
[38] Longhi, Simonetta, Peter Nijkamp, and Jacques Poot (2005). A Meta-Analytic Assess-
ment of the E⁄ect of Immigration on Wages. Journal of Economic Surveys 86 (3):
451-477.
[39] Lucas, Robert E.J. (1988). On the mechanics of economic development. Journal of
Monetary Economics 22 (1), 3-42.
[40] Manacorda Marco, Alan Manning, and Jonathan Wadsworth (2008). The labour market
e⁄ects of immigration. CEP discussion paper CEPCP245, London.
[41] Mattoo, Aaditya, Ileana Cristina Neagu and Caglar Ozden (2008). Brain waste? Edu-
cated immigrants in the US labor market. Journal of Development Economics 87 (2):
255-69.
27[42] Moretti, Enrico (2004a). Estimating the Social Return to Higher Education: Evidence
from Longitudinal and Repeated Cross-Sectional Data. Journal of Econometrics 121
(1), 175-212.
[43] Moretti, Enrico (2004b). Workers￿Education, Spillovers and Productivity: Evidence
from Plant-Level Production Functions. American Economic Review 94 (3), 656-690.
[44] Murphy Kevin M., W. Craig Riddle, and Paul M. Romer (1998). Wages, Skills and
Technology in the United States and Canada. In: E. Helpman (Ed), General Purpose
Technology and Economic Growth, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press.
[45] Ottaviano, Gianmarco L.P., and Giovanni Peri (2010). Rethinking the e⁄ects of immi-
gration on wages. Journal of the European Economic Association (forthcoming).
[46] Ozden, Caglar, Christopher R. Parsons, Maurice Schi⁄ and Terry Walmsley (2010).
The evolution of global bilateral migration 1960-2000. Paper presented at the second
Migration and Development Conference. September 2009: Washington DC.
[47] Ramsey, Frank. 1928. A Mathematical Theory of Saving. Economic Journal 38 (152):
543-559.
[48] Romer, David. 2006. Advanced Macroeconomics. McGraw-Hill, Third Edition. New
York, NY.
[49] Saint-Paul, Gilles (2008). "Brain Drain: Some Evidence from European Expatriates in
the United States, Introduction by Gilles Saint-Paul," CESifo Forum, Ifo Institute for
Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 9(3), pages 19-27, October.
[50] Solow, Robert. 1956. A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth. Quarterly
Journal of Economics 70 (1): 65-94.
[51] Santos Silva, Joao M.C., and Silvana Tenreyro (2006). The log of gravity. Review of
Economics and Statistics 88 (4): 641-658.
[52] Vandenbussche, JØr￿me, Philippe Aghion, and Costas Meghir (2006). Growth, Distance





Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1 
 Recent immigration and emigration flows (1990-2000) as percentages of the skill-specific labor force 
 
  Immigration 
  Emigration  Net Migration 
  Low Education  High education  Low Education  High education  Low Education  High Education 
U.S.  5.8  4.4  0.0  0.2  5.8  4.2 
Canada  0.8  8.0  -1.0  1.2  1.9  6.7 
Australia  -0.6  10.6  0.3  1.3  -0.9  9.2 
U.K.  0.4  8.5  -0.8  4.8  1.1  3.7 
Belgium  1.7  4.4  -0.3  2.2  2.0  2.1 
France  0.1  2.8  0.1  1.1  0.0  1.7 
Germany  2.2  3.1  -0.1  1.1  2.4  2.0 
Greece  0.2  0.2  -0.3  2.8  0.5  -2.6 
Italy  0.9  0.8  -0.6  1.2  1.5  -0.4 
Netherlands  1.3  5.1  -0.1  2.3  1.3  2.8 
Portugal  1.3  1.9  2.0  8.1  -0.7  -6.1 
Spain  2.7  3.8  -0.3  1.9  3.0  1.9 
Sweden  1.5  5.1  0.3  1.8  1.2  3.3 
EU15  1.4  2.6  -0.4  0.9  1.8  1.7 
Czech R.  -0.1  3.9  0.6  1.1  -0.7  2.9 
Hungary  -0.2  0.1  0.0  0.3  -0.2  -0.2 
Poland  -1.1  -0.7  -0.3  6.3  -0.8  -6.9 
Argentina  3.5  1.5  0.5  1.6  3.0  -0.1 
Turkey  0.3  3.1  1.7  2.4  -1.4  0.7 
Mexico  0.0  0.6  7.8  11.4  -7.8  -10.8 
Singapore  0.4  18.8  1.2  4.6  -0.9  14.2 
South Africa  0.5  3.4  0.2  4.7  0.3  -1.4 
Note: Flows of emigrants and immigrants are calculated as difference between stocks in 1990 and 2000. They are measured as the share of the labor force of relative schooling level in 2000. 





 Table 2  
Parameterization of the model 
 
Parameter Estimates 
(source of estimates) 












(Manacorda et al. forthcoming) 
20.0 
(Ottaviano and Peri forthcoming, 
Card 2009) 
Infinity 




(Acemoglu and Angrist 2000) 
0.44 
(Iranzo and Peri 2009) 
0.75 
(Moretti 2004a, 2004b) 
Note: The table summarizes the values of the parameters taken from the previous literature and used in our simulation of wage effects of immigrants and emigrants.  





 Wage effect of immigration, emigration, and net migration: Baseline case 
 






  Immigration  Emigration  Net migration  Immigration  Emigration  Net migration  Immigration  Emigration  Net migration 
U.S.  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.0  0.3  -0.4  -0.1  -0.5 
Canada  1.2  -0.5  0.8  -0.2  0.2  0.0  3.3  -1.4  1.8 
Australia  1.7  -0.2  1.5  -1.1  0.2  -0.8  4.5  -0.6  3.9 
U.K.  1.0  -0.8  0.2  -1.2  1.3  0.2  2.8  -2.5  0.2 
Belgium  0.4  -0.3  0.1  -0.2  0.5  0.3  1.1  -1.3  -0.2 
France  0.3  -0.1  0.2  -0.3  0.2  -0.1  1.0  -0.4  0.6 
Germany  0.2  -0.2  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2  0.4  -0.6  -0.2 
Greece  0.0  -0.3  -0.3  0.0  0.8  0.8  0.0  -1.3  -1.3 
Italy  0.0  -0.2  -0.2  0.1  0.4  0.5  0.0  -0.8  -0.8 
Netherlands  0.5  -0.3  0.2  -0.4  0.5  0.1  1.4  -1.1  0.3 
Portugal  0.1  -0.6  -0.5  -0.1  1.6  1.5  0.2  -2.3  -2.1 
Spain  0.2  -0.2  0.0  -0.1  0.6  0.5  0.5  -0.9  -0.5 
Sweden  0.5  -0.2  0.3  -0.3  0.3  0.0  1.4  -0.7  0.7 
EU15  0.2  -0.2  0.0  -0.1  0.3  0.2  0.5  -0.6  -0.1 
Czech R.  0.3  0.0  0.3  -0.8  0.1  -0.6  1.2  -0.2  1.0 
Hungary  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.1  0.1  0.0  0.1  -0.1  0.0 
Poland  0.0  -0.6  -0.6  -0.1  1.8  1.7  0.1  -2.5  -2.3 
Argentina  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  0.4  0.2  0.7  -0.6  -0.5  -1.0 
Turkey  0.2  -0.1  0.2  -0.6  0.2  -0.3  0.8  -0.3  0.5 
Mexico  0.1  -0.3  -0.3  -0.1  1.0  0.8  0.2  -1.3  -1.1 
Singapore  2.2  -0.5  1.8  -2.8  0.8  -1.7  6.8  -1.6  5.0 
South Africa  0.3  -0.4  -0.2  -0.6  1.3  0.8  0.9  -1.7  -0.9 





Wage effects of immigration, emigration, and net migration: Baseline estimation 
 
1a. Impact on average wages of non-movers (as %) 
 
1b. Impact on wages of highly educated non movers (as %) 
 
 
1c. Impact on wages of less educated non-movers (as %) 
 
Note: The simulations show the impact of immigration (dotted lines) and emigration (dashed lines) on average wages (2a) wages of more 





Robustness-Check: Sensitivity to q 
2a. Impact on average wages of non-movers (as %) 
 
2b. Impact on wages of highly educated non movers (as %) 
 
2c Impact on wages of less educated non movers (as %) 
 
 
Note :  The  simulations  show  the  impact  on  average  wages  (2a)  wages  of  more  educated  (2b)  and  wages  for  less  educated  (2c)  of 
immigration (dotted lines) and emigration (dashed lines). In each panel we use 3 values of the parameter q equal to 1.3, 1.5 and 2.0. The 




Robustness-Check: Sensitivity to I 
3a. Impact on average wages of non-movers (as %) 
 
3b. Impact on wages of highly educated non-movers (as %) 
 
3c. Impact on wages of less educated non-movers (as %) 
 
 
Note :  The  simulations  show  the  impact  on  average  wages  (2a)  wages  of  more  educated  (2b)  and  wages  for  less  educated  (2c)  of 
immigration (dotted lines) and emigration (dashed lines). In each panel we use 3 values of the parameter I equal to 6, 20 and infinity. The 




Robustness-Check: Sensitivity to  
4a. Impact on average wages of non-movers (as %) 
 
4b. Impact on wages of highly educated non-movers (as %) 
 
4c Impact on wages of less educated non-movers (as %) 
 
 
Note :  The  simulations  show  the  impact  on  average  wages  (2a)  wages  of  more  educated  (2b)  and  wages  for  less  educated  (2c)  of 
immigration (dotted lines) and emigration (dashed lines). In each panel we use 3 values of the parameter  equal to 0, 0.44 and 0.75. The 




Figure 5  
Average wage effects of migration 
Best-case and worst-case scenarios 
 
5a. Immigration impact on average wages of non-movers (as %) 
 
 




Note:  The  figures  show  the  estimate  average  wage  effect  of  immigration  for  non-migrants 
considering the two configurations of parameters that produce the most and the least beneficial wage 
effect. 





Extension: Including undocumented immigrants, Western European Countries 
 
 
Note : The figures show the estimate average wage effect of immigration for non-migrants 







Extension: Effects of Immigration Adjusting for Education Quality and skill downgrading 
 
 
Note : The figures show the estimate average wage effect of immigration for non-migrants 
correcting for a country-specific quality of education of immigrants (as recorded for Canadian 
Immigrants)  and  for  the    labor-market  performance  of  highly  educated  immigrants  (as 
calculated for US immigrants) 





Extension: Effects of Immigration including density/crowding externalities 
 
 
Note : The figures show the estimate average wage effect of immigration for non-migrants 





Figure 9  
Extension: Accounting for employment rates (by skill and origin) Western European Countries 
 
 
Note : The figures show the estimate average wage effect of immigration for non-migrants 
accounting for employment rates. We use the following rates for national low-skilled and 
high-skilled, and for foreign low-skilled and high-skill workers, respectively: (0.633, 0.872, 
0.467, 0.749) for Belgium, (0.574, 0.803, 0.603, 0.709) for Spain, (0.675, 0.844, 0.556, 0.731) 
for France, Germany and Italy, (0.603, 0.825, 0.651, 0.712) for Greece, (0.718, 0.877, 0.583, 
0.749) for the Netherlands, (0.738, 0.908, 0.783, 0.902) for Portugal, (0.786, 0.876, 0.598, 




Figure 10  
Extension: Short-run effects of Immigration and Emigration  
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Note: The short-run effects of immigration and emigration have been calculated accounting 
for  the  sluggish  capital  adjustment.  We  assumed  that  the  inflow  of  immigrants  and 
emigrants was distributed equally over the decade 1990-2000 and that Physical capital had 
a yearly  speed of adjustment of 0.10 (10%) each year, starting from the Balanced growth 
path level in 1990. The Figure reports the Long and short run effects of immigration and 


























































































































































Immigration, Short run  Emigration, Short Run
Immigration, Long run Emigration, Long Run40 
 




 Immigration stocks aged 25+ in 1990 and 2000 (x 1,000,000) 
 
  1990 
 
2000 
  Low schooling  High schooling  Total  Low schooling  High schooling  Total 
OECD destinations (30/30)   28.5  12.3  40.8  37.1  20.3  57.4 
Observed non-OECD destinations (31/46)  12.5  1.5  14.0  17.1  3.1  20.2 
Imputed non OECD destinations (134/119)  22.9  2.5  25.4  20.1  2.8  22.9 
Total (195/195)  63.9  16.3  80.2  74.3  26.2  100.5 41 
 
Table A2 







  Total  Observed  Imputed  Imputed/tot (%)  Total  Observed  Imputed  Imputed/tot (%) 
U.S.  757.2  676.4  80.8  10.7  900.6  838.3  62.3  6.9 
Canada  856.7  846.6  10.1  1.2  880.9  874.7  6.3  0.7 
Australia  163.9  147.1  16.7  10.2  242.7  227.4  15.3  6.3 
U.K.  3302.9  3070.0  232.9  7.1  3442.6  3260.4  182.2  5.3 
Belgium  337.4  293.8  43.7  12.9  368.2  328.0  40.1  10.9 
France  1001.7  697.4  304.2  30.4  1148.6  917.4  231.2  20.1 
Germany  2448.6  2359.0  89.6  3.7  2554.5  2451.8  102.7  4.0 
Greece  861.1  756.8  104.3  12.1  876.4  757.1  119.2  13.6 
Italy  2714.3  2660.0  54.3  2.0  2604.9  2548.6  56.3  2.2 
Netherlands  589.1  574.7  14.3  2.4  639.7  625.5  14.2  2.2 
Portugal  1256.4  1160.8  95.6  7.6  1450.4  1315.4  135.0  9.3 
Spain  959.4  897.6  61.9  6.4  973.3  924.7  48.6  5.0 
Sweden  138.9  135.5  3.4  2.5  182.2  174.7  7.4  4.1 
EU15  9693.7  8648.7  1044.9  10.8  9405.9  8420.6  985.3  10.5 
Czech R.  171.6  169.3  2.3  1.4  217.2  215.4  1.8  0.8 
Hungary  339.1  332.3  6.8  2.0  342.0  325.6  16.4  4.8 
Poland  1309.8  1194.4  115.4  8.8  1419.2  1269.2  150.0  10.6 
Argentina  208.4  183.1  25.3  12.1  355.9  338.3  17.6  4.9 
Turkey  1517.9  1488.0  29.9  2.0  2117.5  2082.2  35.3  1.7 
Mexico  2725.2  2693.8  31.4  1.2  6502.1  6457.5  44.6  0.7 
Singapore  84.9  57.1  27.8  32.8  136.8  132.0  4.8  3.5 
South Africa  224.1  132.3  91.8  41.0  360.0  274.0  86.0  23.9 
Note:  The observed emigrants are in one of the 30 OECD countries or one of the 46 (in 2000) or 31 (in1990) non-OECD countries for which we have data. The procedure to impute data is 




 Stock of immigrants and emigrants in 1990 and 2000 as percentage of the skill-specific labor force 
 
  1990  2000 
  Immigrants  Emigrants  Immigrants  Emigrants 
  Low schooling  High schooling  Low schooling  High schooling  Low schooling  High schooling  Low schooling  High schooling 
U.S.  8.9  9.7  0.4  0.6  15.5  11.0  0.4  0.6 
Canada  18.2  23.9  4.5  5.2  19.0  25.6  3.4  5.0 
Australia  27.1  34.7  1.2  2.5  23.2  37.3  1.3  3.2 
U.K.  6.8  9.2  6.5  20.2  7.1  15.4  5.7  20.1 
Belgium  12.3  6.1  4.9  5.3  14.0  9.1  4.6  6.4 
France  10.7  4.2  2.5  3.4  10.1  6.3  2.5  3.9 
Germany  6.1  4.5  3.7  7.0  8.2  6.6  3.4  6.6 
Greece  6.0  8.6  12.0  20.2  5.6  5.5  10.6  15.3 
Italy  1.4  1.5  7.1  6.1  2.2  1.9  6.2  5.6 
Netherlands  16.1  14.2  4.6  11.6  16.1  16.2  4.2  11.3 
Portugal  0.7  1.7  20.4  14.7  2.0  3.0  20.9  17.5 
Spain  2.8  4.2  3.9  3.4  5.2  6.6  3.2  4.2 
Sweden  10.8  7.9  1.9  4.1  12.4  11.2  2.2  4.9 
EU15  3.8  3.6  3.3  7.0  5.0  5.3  2.8  6.3 
Czech R.  6.0  3.0  1.7  12.1  5.7  6.1  2.3  10.0 
Hungary  0.8  0.8  3.4  19.1  0.7  0.7  3.4  15.9 
Poland  4.1  5.7  4.5  17.6  2.8  3.6  4.0  19.6 
Argentina  0.4  0.1  0.8  3.5  3.9  1.5  1.3  3.7 
Turkey  1.9  4.6  5.8  10.2  1.8  5.1  6.2  6.9 
Mexico  0.3  1.6  7.9  12.4  0.2  1.6  13.5  18.5 
Singapore  24.3  10.2  3.5  10.8  18.1  24.1  3.8  10.2 
South Africa  3.7  13.5  1.0  10.7  3.3  8.0  0.9  8.4 
Note: The data on the stock of immigrants and emigrants were obtained by the authors extending the Docquier and Marfouk (2005) database.   
 
 












  Low schooling  High schooling  Total  Low schooling  High schooling  Total 
U.S.  60.8  39.2  100.0  48.7  51.3  100.0 
Canada  56.2  43.8  100.0  48.5  51.5  100.0 
Australia  68.9  31.1  100.0  66.0  34.0  100.0 
U.K.  84.1  15.9  100.0  80.2  19.8  100.0 
Belgium  77.2  22.8  100.0  72.6  27.5  100.0 
Portugal  78.1  21.9  100.0  76.1  23.9  100.0 
Germany  78.2  21.8  100.0  74.5  25.5  100.0 
Greece  89.1  10.9  100.0  84.8  15.2  100.0 
Italy  85.7  14.3  100.0  82.0  18.0  100.0 
Netherlands  80.8  19.2  100.0  78.0  22.0  100.0 
Portugal  90.8  9.2  100.0  87.2  12.8  100.0 
Spain  88.5  11.5  100.0  84.8  15.2  100.0 
Sweden  77.5  22.5  100.0  72.5  27.5  100.0 
EU15  82.2  17.8  100.0  78.8  21.2  100.0 
Czech R.  91.5  8.5  100.0  89.2  10.8  100.0 
Hungary  89.9  10.1  100.0  88.0  12.0  100.0 
Poland  91.1  8.9  100.0  88.9  11.1  100.0 
Argentina  86.0  14.0  100.0  80.3  19.7  100.0 
Turkey  95.0  5.0  100.0  91.5  8.5  100.0 
Mexico  90.9  9.1  100.0  88.8  11.2  100.0 
Singapore  83.6  16.4  100.0  78.4  21.6  100.0 
South Africa  95.0  5.0  100.0  89.7  10.3  100.0 
Note: The labor force of a country is defined as people older than 25. The data are from a collection of sources as described in the text. 
 